Beyond coalition and opposition? The effect of councilwide agreements on legislative voting behaviour in Dutch municipalities

Abstract A well‐established finding in the field of legislative behaviour is that parliamentary voting behaviour is nearly always strongly structured by the coalition‐opposition dynamic, even beyond the issues agreed on in the coalition agreement. Can parties break the mould of this coalition‐opposition division? Several Dutch municipal councils work with a councilwide agreement (raadsakkoord) with the specific goal that there is no demarcated coalition and opposition. This could open the political process up for more issue‐driven voting. We test whether council agreements change voting behaviour in the local council. By comparing voting in these municipalities before and after implementing councilwide agreements, we show that these agreements lower the extent to which voting is structured by the coalition‐opposition division. Coalition parties are less likely to vote the same when a councilwide agreement is present. The strength of the coalition‐opposition division depends upon the choices of political parties.