More Than a Theory: Conspiracy Theorising As a Practical Tradition

In answering the question, ‘What is a conspiracy theory?’ scholars typically take an epistemological view, with many asking whether the term’s pejorative use as a marker of obvious falsehood is justified. Especially among philosophers, a consensus has emerged that conspiracy theories should not be dismissed as prima facie false, that each should be judged on its own merits. However, while some philosophers have encouraged social scientists to embrace this epistemological view of conspiracy theories, this article argues that it is less useful for those of us working in political studies. We are right to worry about being too dismissive of all charges of conspiracy, but conspiracy theorising involves more than just making truth claims; it is about politics, history and culture too. In approaching it through the narrow lens of epistemology, we miss much of what is happening in conspiracy theorising. My aim in this article is to offer a new framework for analysing conspiracy theorising as a practice, rather than as a category of explanation. This framework builds on Michael Billig and Jovan Byford’s idea of the conspiracy theory tradition, showing conspiracy theorising to involve the recycling and adaptation of pre-existing ideas, themes and texts to fit new situations.