Petrification in Contemporary Set Theory: The Multiverse and the Later Wittgenstein

This paper has two aims. First, we argue that Wittgenstein's notion of petrification can be used to explain phenomena in advanced mathematics, sometimes better than more popular views on mathematics, such as formalism, even though petrification usually suffers from a diet of examples of a very basic nature (in particular a focus on addition of small numbers). Second, we analyse current disagreements on the absolute undecidability of CH under the notion of petrification and hinge epistemology. We argue that in contemporary set theory the usage of construction techniques for set-theoretic models in which the Continuum Hypothesis holds and those in which it fails have petrified into the normative demand that CH remain undecidable. That is, the continuous and successful practices involving the construction of various set-theoretic models now act as a normative hinge shared among practitioners, i.e., have normative force in the discipline. However, not all hinges are universal, which is why we find disagreements in set theory. We will show that this is a refinement of, and partially conflicts with, the arguments presented by set theorist Joel David Hamkins.