Border fortification and legibility: Evidence from Afghanistan

Abstract States often fortify their borders against militant threats. How do these efforts shape civilian welfare and perceptions in borderland communities? I conceptualize border fortification as a legibility‐building endeavor. By bolstering state reach in areas of weak historical penetration, fortification enhances the government's capacity for monitoring, administration, and control. Yet, expanding state authority also disrupts traditional cross‐border markets. A trade‐off between security and corruption emerges in consequence. I provide evidence for this theory in a difference‐in‐differences framework, combining administrative records on violence and representative data from a NATO‐commissioned survey fielded across Afghanistan. Fortification facilitates government information‐collection, improving security provision and fostering civilian reliance on state forces. Enhanced state capacity is countervailed by negative economic impacts. By disturbing the informal borderland economy, fortification fuels criminalization and local opposition. Civilians rely on illicit economic entrepreneurs to sustain traditional market access. Higher smuggling rents fuel official corruption and bribe‐taking. The findings point to a key dilemma inherent in border fortification strategies.