Towards minilateral climate governance? Analysing climate club design options through the lens of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities

Abstract In response to the limitations of the United Nations climate change regime, a range of dynamic climate governance arrangements have emerged, including minilateral ‘climate clubs’. Although proposed as a solution to move international climate policy forward, depending on their specific design, climate clubs could raise implications from the perspective of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR‐RC). Accordingly, this article aims to analyse different climate club design options through the lens of CBDR‐RC. First, it explains the general rationale for climate clubs and presents a spectrum of key club design features. Second, this article describes how CBDR‐RC has been operationalised under the climate regime. Third, drawing on current club‐like arrangements—namely, the Climate Club, the Clean Energy Ministerial and the proposed Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium—it critically examines whether different design options are (likely to be) compatible with CBDR‐RC.