Inside Vladimir Putin’s Hall of Mirrors: How the Kremlin’s Miscalculation of Western Resolve Emboldened Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Abstract Why did Vladimir Putin order the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, despite numerous warnings from Western countries about the consequences of such an action? This article argues that misperceptions about having the upper hand vis-à-vis Western countries, formed and proliferated among the Russian leadership, emboldened the Kremlin to launch the military invasion of Ukraine, assuming that the West would stand down in the face of the attack. Based on a detailed analysis of Russian elites’ discourse through the theoretical lens of interdependence studies, this study demonstrates that Putin miscalculated Western resolve largely because of two key misperceptions. First, Putin’s elites were convinced that the West was asymmetrically dependent on Russia, viewing it as a strategic resource that would tie the hands of Western and EU countries, eventually making them accept the outcome of the war. Second, the Kremlin believed that Ukraine occupied a secondary role in Western interests that would further limit the West’s involvement in the conflict, as it would not risk exposing its dependence on Moscow for the sake of an issue that, in the Kremlin’s eyes, was marginal to European and American security.

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Publication Details

Journal
Nationalities Papers
Published
2024-10-31
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2024.76
Citations
2
Primary Topic
International Relations and Foreign Policy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.46
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article

Inside Vladimir Putin’s Hall of Mirrors: How the Kremlin’s Miscalculation of Western Resolve Emboldened Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Mikhail Polianskii
2 citations
Nationalities Papers
International Relations and Foreign Policy
4.46
article

Inside Vladimir Putin’s Hall of Mirrors: How the Kremlin’s Miscalculation of Western Resolve Emboldened Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Mikhail Polianskii
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Abstract Why did Vladimir Putin order the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, despite numerous warnings from Western countries about the consequences of such an action? This article argues that misperceptions about having the upper hand vis-à-vis Western countries, formed and proliferated among the Russian leadership, emboldened the Kremlin to launch the military invasion of Ukraine, assuming that the West would stand down in the face of the attack. Based on a detailed analysis of Russian elites’ discourse through the theoretical lens of interdependence studies, this study demonstrates that Putin miscalculated Western resolve largely because of two key misperceptions. First, Putin’s elites were convinced that the West was asymmetrically dependent on Russia, viewing it as a strategic resource that would tie the hands of Western and EU countries, eventually making them accept the outcome of the war. Second, the Kremlin believed that Ukraine occupied a secondary role in Western interests that would further limit the West’s involvement in the conflict, as it would not risk exposing its dependence on Moscow for the sake of an issue that, in the Kremlin’s eyes, was marginal to European and American security.

Nationalities Papers
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (DE)
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
International Relations and Foreign Policy
4.46
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