Reassessing Kripke’s Anti-Materialism and Almog’s Challenge
In this text, we point out some obvious commitments of the identity theory of mind which allow the identity theorist to sidestep Saul Kripke’s famous anti-materialist argument. We also argue that a recent paper by Joseph Almog fails to undermine Kripke’s internalism about sensations.
Authors
- Brian Garrett (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0604-0260)
- Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8621-6413)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
- Published
- 2024-10-31
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2024_80_3_0815
- Primary Topic
- Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00