Indeterminacy and the Immateriality of Thought: Ross on Natural and Formal Structures

This paper addresses a debate on the immateriality of thought, focusing on James Ross’s argument regarding the indeterminacy of physical processes with respect to pure functions. Ross posits that some human cognitive processes, particularly logical reasoning and mathematical functions, exhibit a formal determinacy that no physical process can have, challenging physicalist accounts of mind. A critical response by Peter Dillard, known as the “schmitosis objection,” attempts to undermine Ross’s argument by drawing a parallel between biological processes like mitosis and formal functions such as addition. This paper defends Ross’s position by highlighting an overlooked distinction between transcendent and formal determinacy. By demonstrating that biological processes like mitosis are transcendentally determinate while pure functions are formally determinate, the paper refutes Dillard’s objection and supports Ross’s claim of the partial non-physicality of thought. The argument contributes to ongoing debates in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics by clarifying the distinct ways physical and non-physical processes relate to determinacy.