Uncovering Recurring Vulnerabilities through Taint-Extracted Operator Sequences
Recurring vulnerabilities, caused by code reuse, spread into new software when developers copy flawed open-source code. Detecting these vulnerabilities is challenging due to limitations in accuracy, scalability, and vulnerability-type coverage. Recent advancements by Kang et al. [1] improved accuracy and scalability using taint analysis but had limited coverage. We propose OpSMAtcher (Operation Sequence Matcher), a comprehensive method leveraging taint analysis to extract sequences of operators and function calls as signatures, and employing string-matching algorithms and rule-based filters for accurate signature matching. Experiments show that OpSMAtcher supports 24 common vulnerability types with 0.768 precision and 0.721 recall, whereas a state-of-the-art tool supports only seven types with about 0.3 lower accuracy. Additionally, OpSMAtcher identified eight previously unknown recurring vulnerabilities in Debian packages, showing superior coverage and effectiveness over existing methods.
Authors
- Takeshi Takahashi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6477-7770)
- Hsu‐Chun Hsiao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9592-6911)
- Chia‐Hao Hsu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8832-0345)
- C. C. Yang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3476-3802)
- Tao Ban
Institutions
- National Taiwan University (TW)
- National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (JP)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2024-09-30
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/cns62487.2024.10735703
- Primary Topic
- Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Ministry of Education
- National Taiwan University
- National Science and Technology Council