The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy and Practice against the Nationalist Party, 1945-1946

This article sought to reveal whether the Chinese Communist Party at the time truly intended to achieve the communist revolution it hoped for through peace and negotiation through a review of the political negotiation process within China after the victory in the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Communist Party’s preparations for civil war. Mao Zedong’s theory of coalition government was to build a new China by establishing a formal government that included representatives of all parties and factions, as well as independent and non-party factions. The coalition government theory was supported by various political parties and organizations because it went far beyond national-public cooperation in terms of government composition. While Mao Zedong was holding talks in Chongqing at Chiang Kai-shek’s request, the Communist Party leadership in Yan'an was accelerating preparations for civil war. The Chinese Communist Party Army established the strategic policy of “Northward Development and Southern Defense”(向北發展 向南防禦) to disrupt the monopoly of the Nationalist Government Army in the Manchuria region and prevent the Chinese Communist Party Army's individual defeat in the southern Huazhong region. In addition, the units were expanded through the creation of field corps and field forces, and from an operational perspective, an attempt was made to transition from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare. In particular, the reinforcement of 300,000 troops in Manchuria, who were acquired from the Soviet Army and equipped with new Japanese weapons and heavy equipment, immediately raised the military power of the Chinese Communist Party to the next level. In this way, the Chinese Communist Party demonstrated its willingness to negotiate externally by promoting the theory of a coalition government, while internally it was gradually narrowing the gap in military power with the Nationalist government army by strengthening its military power.