Insider Trading and CEO Pay-Gap Induced Turnover

We explore how insider trading returns, disparities in executive pay, and CEO turnover are interrelated. Our findings reveal both independent and interactive effects for insider trading returns, the CEO pay gap, and the likelihood of CEO turnover. First, an increase in abnormal returns from insider purchases lowers the probability of a CEO’s turnover, while an increase in abnormal returns from insider sales increases the likelihood of a CEO’s dismissal. Second, the CEO pay gap negatively affects the probability of CEO turnover for insider purchases, but it does not have a similar effect on insider sales. Third, the interaction between insider abnormal returns and any CEO pay disparity influences the impact of these returns on CEO turnover. Specifically, this interaction diminishes the positive effect of insider selling on the probability of a CEO’s dismissal, offsets the negative effect of insider purchasing on CEO dismissal, and, finally, amplifies the negative impact of CEO pay disparity on the probability of a CEO’s dismissal during periods witnessing insider purchases.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of risk and financial management
Published
2024-10-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17110483
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Insider Trading and CEO Pay-Gap Induced Turnover

Ann‐Ngoc Nguyen, Andros Gregoriou, William Forbes, Viet Hoang Le
Journal of risk and financial management
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

Insider Trading and CEO Pay-Gap Induced Turnover

Ann‐Ngoc Nguyen, Andros Gregoriou, William Forbes, Viet Hoang Le
article en

Abstract

We explore how insider trading returns, disparities in executive pay, and CEO turnover are interrelated. Our findings reveal both independent and interactive effects for insider trading returns, the CEO pay gap, and the likelihood of CEO turnover. First, an increase in abnormal returns from insider purchases lowers the probability of a CEO’s turnover, while an increase in abnormal returns from insider sales increases the likelihood of a CEO’s dismissal. Second, the CEO pay gap negatively affects the probability of CEO turnover for insider purchases, but it does not have a similar effect on insider sales. Third, the interaction between insider abnormal returns and any CEO pay disparity influences the impact of these returns on CEO turnover. Specifically, this interaction diminishes the positive effect of insider selling on the probability of a CEO’s dismissal, offsets the negative effect of insider purchasing on CEO dismissal, and, finally, amplifies the negative impact of CEO pay disparity on the probability of a CEO’s dismissal during periods witnessing insider purchases.

Journal of risk and financial managementVol. 17(11)
University of Dundee (GB), Middlesex University London (GB), Liverpool John Moores University (GB), Coventry University (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 68%
Corporate Finance and Governance
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Insider Trading and CEO Pay-Gap Induced Turnover — Ann‐Ngoc Nguyen, Andros Gregoriou, et al. · Journal of risk and financial management (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS