Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies versus Ignorance, Selective Truth, and Silence

In a novel sender-receiver game, we compare deception through outright, “direct” lies or three evasions: feigned ignorance, selective truth, and silence. We propose that deception incurs four psychological costs (deception, falsehood, influence, and social image) and that their sum is greater for direct lies than for evasions. Consistent with this, we find that senders are more likely to deceive through evasion than through direct lies, even when correctly believing direct lies are more persuasive. Because receivers treat observed messages at face value, they are more likely to choose senders’ preferred action when senders lie directly compared to when they use evasive language.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics
Published
2024-10-28
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1086/733780
Citations
4
Primary Topic
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.58
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article

Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies versus Ignorance, Selective Truth, and Silence

Valeria Burdea, Despoina Alempaki, Daniel Read
4 citations
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
1.58
article

Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies versus Ignorance, Selective Truth, and Silence

Valeria Burdea, Despoina Alempaki, Daniel Read
article en
4 citations

Abstract

In a novel sender-receiver game, we compare deception through outright, “direct” lies or three evasions: feigned ignorance, selective truth, and silence. We propose that deception incurs four psychological costs (deception, falsehood, influence, and social image) and that their sum is greater for direct lies than for evasions. Consistent with this, we find that senders are more likely to deceive through evasion than through direct lies, even when correctly believing direct lies are more persuasive. Because receivers treat observed messages at face value, they are more likely to choose senders’ preferred action when senders lie directly compared to when they use evasive language.

Journal of Political Economy MicroeconomicsVol. 3(4)
University of Warwick (GB), Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 13%
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
1.58
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