Research on Knowledge Payment Product Supply Chain Governance Based on Blockchain: An Evolutionary Game Model

ABSTRACT Blockchain provides a new opportunity to govern the dilemmas in the knowledge payment product supply chain. This paper introduces blockchain into the evolutionary game to explore the behavioral strategies of knowledge providers, platforms, and consumers and to analyze in depth the influence of initial willingness and blockchain‐related factors by the system dynamics. The analysis shows that (1) improving the tripartite initial willingness is conducive to accelerating the process of supply chain governance and making the system reach an ideal state: knowledge providers choose compliance creation, platforms adopt blockchain, and consumers buy authorized product; (2) there are specific thresholds for the blockchain adoption cost and the premium of product brought by blockchain, only when the cost and premium are lower than the thresholds, the system evolves towards the ideal state; (3) when blockchain is adopted, it can effectively inhibit knowledge providers' illegal creation behavior and consumers' piracy behavior by increasing the punishments of platforms on knowledge providers and consumers. The results provide guidance to implement effective governance and the orderly development of knowledge payment industry.

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Publication Details

Journal
Managerial and Decision Economics
Published
2024-10-28
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4412
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.56
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article

Research on Knowledge Payment Product Supply Chain Governance Based on Blockchain: An Evolutionary Game Model

Lili Liu, Changxin Luo
2 citations
Managerial and Decision Economics
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
1.56
article

Research on Knowledge Payment Product Supply Chain Governance Based on Blockchain: An Evolutionary Game Model

Lili Liu, Changxin Luo
article en
2 citations

Abstract

ABSTRACT Blockchain provides a new opportunity to govern the dilemmas in the knowledge payment product supply chain. This paper introduces blockchain into the evolutionary game to explore the behavioral strategies of knowledge providers, platforms, and consumers and to analyze in depth the influence of initial willingness and blockchain‐related factors by the system dynamics. The analysis shows that (1) improving the tripartite initial willingness is conducive to accelerating the process of supply chain governance and making the system reach an ideal state: knowledge providers choose compliance creation, platforms adopt blockchain, and consumers buy authorized product; (2) there are specific thresholds for the blockchain adoption cost and the premium of product brought by blockchain, only when the cost and premium are lower than the thresholds, the system evolves towards the ideal state; (3) when blockchain is adopted, it can effectively inhibit knowledge providers' illegal creation behavior and consumers' piracy behavior by increasing the punishments of platforms on knowledge providers and consumers. The results provide guidance to implement effective governance and the orderly development of knowledge payment industry.

Managerial and Decision EconomicsVol. 46(2)
Zhengzhou University of Light Industry (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 12%
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
1.56
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