Registered Replication Report: A Large Multilab Cross-Cultural Conceptual Replication of Turri et al. (2015)

According to the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge, people can truly know something only if they have a belief that is both justified and true (i.e., knowledge is JTB). This account was challenged by Gettier, who argued that JTB does not explain knowledge attributions in certain situations, later called “Gettier-type cases,” wherein protagonists are justified in believing something to be true, but their belief was correct only because of luck. Laypeople may not attribute knowledge to protagonists with justified but only luckily true beliefs. Although some research has found evidence for these so-called Gettier intuitions, Turri et al. found no evidence that participants attributed knowledge in a counterfeit-object Gettier-type case differently than in a matched case of JTB. In a large-scale, cross-cultural conceptual replication of Turri and colleagues’ Experiment 1 ( N = 4,724) using a within-participants design and three vignettes across 19 geopolitical regions, we did find evidence for Gettier intuitions; participants were 1.86 times more likely to attribute knowledge to protagonists in standard cases of JTB than to protagonists in Gettier-type cases. These results suggest that Gettier intuitions may be detectable across different scenarios and cultural contexts. However, the size of the Gettier intuition effect did vary by vignette, and the Turri et al. vignette produced the smallest effect, which was similar in size to that observed in the original study. Differences across vignettes suggest that epistemic intuitions may also depend on contextual factors unrelated to the criteria of knowledge, such as the characteristics of the protagonist being evaluated.

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Publication Details

Journal
Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science
Published
2024-10-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/25152459241267902
Citations
3
Primary Topic
Social and Intergroup Psychology
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
3.40

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article

Registered Replication Report: A Large Multilab Cross-Cultural Conceptual Replication of Turri et al. (2015)

Jordan Wagge, Athulya S. Rathnayake, Jan Philipp Röer, Christoph Schild et al.
3 citations
Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science
Social and Intergroup Psychology
3.40
article

Registered Replication Report: A Large Multilab Cross-Cultural Conceptual Replication of Turri et al. (2015)

Jordan Wagge, Athulya S. Rathnayake, Jan Philipp Röer, Christoph Schild, Ian D. Stephen, Carlota Batres, Erin Michelle Buchanan, Jana Schrötter, Rafael Ramos Ribeiro, Kévin Vezirian, Radosław Kabut, Karlijn Massar, Ke Wang, Christopher R. Chartier, Marta Kowal, Jaroslav Gottfried, Péter Szécsi, Yanna J. Weisberg, Waldir M. Sampaio, Caro Hautekiet, Erica D. Musser, Patrí­cia Arriaga, Dana Awlia, Kaitlyn M. Werner, Marina Romanova, Sophia Christin Weißgerber, Kathleen Schmidt, Qinyu Xiao, Stefan Stieger, Mark John Brandt, Martin Voracek, Natalia Bogatyreva, Nándor Hajdú, William E. Davis, Elian H. Thiele-Evans, Christopher L. Aberson, Andrei Dumbravă, Savannah C Lewis, Vilius Dranseika, Susana Ruiz Fernández, Krystian Barzykowski, Chris Isloi, Megan R. Dunn, Patrick S. Forscher, Daniel Storage, Balázs Aczél, Michał Misiak, Michael Schulte‐Mecklenbeck, Andree Hartanto, Neil Levy, Nicole Legate, Anthony J. Krafnick, Piotr Sorokowski, Asil Ali Özdoğru, Ulrich S. Tran, Carmel Levitan, Gerit Pfuhl, Julita Kielińska, Gerald J. Haeffel, Thomas Rhys Evans, Hendrik Godbersen, Martin Jensen Mækelæ, Braeden Hall, Sean T. H. Lee, Emmett M. Larsen, Jennifer L Beaudry, Harry Farmer, Hannah Moshontz, Bradley J. Baker, Chin Wen Cong, Andy P. Field, Iris Vilares, Agata Groyecka-Bernard, Evie Vergauwe, Aurélien Graton, Pavol Kačmár, Robert M. Ross, Sara Álvarez Solas, Elizabeth Takacs, Simona Ďurbisová, David Moreau, Sau-Chin Chen, Myrto Pantazi, Jon Grahe, Florián Cova, Hans IJzerman, Gilad Feldman, Leonhard Volz, Kostas Papaioannou, Leslie D. Cramblet Alvarez, Joseph P. McFall, Michael R. Andreychik, Agnieszka Sorokowska, Irina Prusova, Ricky Haneda, Ekaterina Pronizius, Marina Milyavskaya, M. Bognár, Felix Kiunke, Caroline Kolle, Louise Villafana, Hannah W. Branit, Paweł Lubomski, Julia N. Teeter, Xanthippi Alexi Vassiliou, Ester Nosáľová, Alexys M. Miller, Roxana E. Morariu, Jackson G. Lu, Peter Howlett, Jennifer Novak, Raymond Wu, Julia Valeiro-Paterlini, Felizitas Pernerstofer, Alex F. Danvers
article en
3 citations

Abstract

According to the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge, people can truly know something only if they have a belief that is both justified and true (i.e., knowledge is JTB). This account was challenged by Gettier, who argued that JTB does not explain knowledge attributions in certain situations, later called “Gettier-type cases,” wherein protagonists are justified in believing something to be true, but their belief was correct only because of luck. Laypeople may not attribute knowledge to protagonists with justified but only luckily true beliefs. Although some research has found evidence for these so-called Gettier intuitions, Turri et al. found no evidence that participants attributed knowledge in a counterfeit-object Gettier-type case differently than in a matched case of JTB. In a large-scale, cross-cultural conceptual replication of Turri and colleagues’ Experiment 1 ( N = 4,724) using a within-participants design and three vignettes across 19 geopolitical regions, we did find evidence for Gettier intuitions; participants were 1.86 times more likely to attribute knowledge to protagonists in standard cases of JTB than to protagonists in Gettier-type cases. These results suggest that Gettier intuitions may be detectable across different scenarios and cultural contexts. However, the size of the Gettier intuition effect did vary by vignette, and the Turri et al. vignette produced the smallest effect, which was similar in size to that observed in the original study. Differences across vignettes suggest that epistemic intuitions may also depend on contextual factors unrelated to the criteria of knowledge, such as the characteristics of the protagonist being evaluated.

Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological ScienceVol. 7(4)
Eötvös Loránd University (HU), University of Kassel (DE), University of Notre Dame (US), Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (PT), Southern Illinois University Carbondale (US), University of Geneva (CH), National Research University Higher School of Economics (RU), University of Bern (CH), Fairfield University (US), Jagiellonian University (PL), Üsküdar University (TR), University of Vienna (AT), University of Minnesota (US), University of Denver (US), University of Wisconsin–Madison (US), University of Arizona (US), Alexandru Ioan Cuza University (RO), University of British Columbia (CA), California Polytechnic State University (US), Harrisburg University of Science and Technology (US), University of Auckland (NZ), Witten/Herdecke University (DE), University of Sussex (GB), Flinders University (AU), University of Alabama (US), Franklin & Marshall College (US), Avila University (US), The University of Western Australia (AU), Universidade Federal de São Carlos (BR), Illinois Institute of Technology (US), University of Toronto (CA), Institut Universitaire de France (FR), Wittenberg University (US), Tzu Chi University (TW), Dominican University (US), Cal Poly Humboldt (US), Ashland University (US), Florida International University (US), University of Pavol Jozef Šafárik (SK), Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (GR), Masaryk University (CZ), University of Wrocław (PL), University of Münster (DE), FOM University of Applied Sciences for Economics and Management (DE), Babeș-Bolyai University (RO), Maastricht University (NL), University of Oxford (GB), Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy (CZ), James Cook University Singapore (SG), Institute of Psychology (PL), Busara Center for Behavioral Economics (KE), Karl Landsteiner University of Health Sciences (AT), Universidad Regional Amazónica IKIAM (EC), University of Virginia (US), Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg (DE), Nottingham Trent University (GB), University of Rochester (US), University of Greenwich (GB), Swinburne University of Technology (AU), Stony Brook University (US), Pacific Lutheran University (US), SUNY Fredonia (US), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US), Carleton University (CA), Université Savoie Mont Blanc (FR), Occidental College (US), Linfield College (US), Marmara University (TR), UiT The Arctic University of Norway (NO), Singapore Management University (SG), Temple University (US), Michigan State University (US), University of Amsterdam (NL), University of Hong Kong (HK), Université Grenoble Alpes (FR), California State Polytechnic University (US), Macquarie University (AU)
John Templeton Foundation, National Foundation for Science and Technology Development, Narodowym Centrum Nauki, Kultúrna a Edukacná Grantová Agentúra MŠVVaŠ SR, Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Australian Research Council, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
Openalex Percentile: Top 7%
Social and Intergroup Psychology
3.40
DOIOpen Access PDFOpenAlex
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