Corporate moral hazard and <scp>ESG</scp> performance: Unveiling the influence of gross enforcement actions and ownership dynamics in <scp>US</scp> multinational corporations

Abstract Existing research often highlights the impact of several categories of corporate enforcement action on corporate performance, thus overlooking the impossibility of isolating the impacts of other concurrent enforcement actions. The current study employed the gross value and volume of corporate enforcement actions to examine the influence of corporate moral hazard (CMH) on environmental, social, and governance performance (ESGP) along with ownership dynamics. The S&amp;P data from 2018 to 2022 were analyzed, covering 1925 observations of US multinational corporations (MNCs) based on various aspects of corporate governance (CG). Institutional, insider, and family ownership were applied as proxies for ownership structure. CSRHub ratings represented ESGP, while Sustainalytics ratings were used for robustness. The analysis involved various econometric models, including the feasible generalized least squares model (FGLSM). Resultantly, CMH negatively affected ESGP, whereas CG mechanisms revealed a positive influence. Contrary to existing literature, the size of corporate law cases is a stronger proxy for CMH than the amount of enforcement actions. Although institutional owners decrease the number of enforcement actions, they encounter substantial penalties. Above‐average insiders reduce lawsuits and exert significant control over penalties, while below‐average insiders result in heavier penalties and lawsuits to an extent. Families are the most positively influential owners; having more family owners increases penalties and ESGP but reduces lawsuit size, particularly when ownership exceeds the mean percentage.