The Fall of the First Republic of Armenia in the Context of Relations with the Entente Countries, USA and Russia

The article discusses the issues of the Western orientation of the government of the First Republic with its Entente allies, and significant failures in foreign policy choices. It is emphasised that the leadership of the Republic of Armenia in 1918‒1920. placed excessively unjustified hopes on the Entente countries in resolving issues of recognition of independence and sovereignty and disputed territories. Reliance on the Entente countries during the First Republic (May 1918 ‒ December 1920) did not guarantee the continued existence and security of the Armenian republic. It is noted that the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Entente powers (Great Britain, France) and the United States on August 10, 1920, was deceptive and was not recognised by either the Sultan’s government or the Kemalists. In this regard, the article states that, however, not a single European state has expressed a desire to help resolve territorial issues through diplomatic pressure on Turkey or the use of military force. It is also shown that as a result, the RA government ignored the Armenian-Russian agreement signed on August 10 and tried to resolve issues independently, which at the end of 1920 led to complete defeat in the Armenian-Turkish war and capitulation. It is demonstrated that Soviet Russia really assessed the current situation for intervention with the goal of rapid Sovietisation of Armenia, creating an Armenian buffer, instead of the First Republic, creating the Soviet Republic. It is concluded that the orientation of the government and major failures in army construction turned out to be the dominant factors and reasons for the decline of the First Republic of Armenia at the end of 1920. The ineffectiveness of the militarydiplomatic support of the Entente states and the underestimation of the Russian factor are revealed. The RA’s orientation toward its European allies and the United States turned out to be disastrous, since it belatedly became obvious that the Armenian leadership had made a mistake in its calculations and turned out to be short-sighted, since it did not even try to act faster in order to win real and necessary military-political support from Russia. As a result, we can come to the conclusion that after a steep fall at the end of 1920, the First Republic of Armenia, on the basis of the Armenian-Russian agreement signed on December 2, acquired a new historical perspective for further existence in the form of a Soviet socialist republic.