Channel structures of third-party platforms

The growing prominence of third-party (3P) platforms in the online retail sector has made the selection of an appropriate channel structure strategy a critical concern for manufacturers, 3P platforms, and retailers operating within this environment. We construct a Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as the leader, evaluating four channel structures: (A) reselling and retailer agency selling, (B) agency selling and retailer agency selling, (C) reselling and agency selling, and (D) reselling, agency selling, and retailer agency selling. The supply chain can adopt two pricing strategies: uniform pricing (UP) and differential pricing (DP). Research indicates that expanding the number of channels may not always enhance profitability for suppliers and supply chain participants. Under strategy UP, the 3P platform opts for structure B, whereas the retailer favors structure C. Incorporating agency selling is advantageous for the manufacturer; however, structure A represents the least beneficial option for the supply chain. Under strategy DP, a substantial portion of the pareto optimal region is present. Intense competition and reduced agency fees lead both the supply chain as a whole and individual member to prefer structure A. The addition of a reselling or retailer agency channel boosts the manufacturer’s profits, and benefits the 3P platform, while structure D emerges as the least favorable option for the retailer. Furthermore, under strategy DP, structure C is rendered obsolete, signifying the retailer’s essential role in the supply chain to the advantage of all involved parties. This study advances the scholarly understanding of sales models and platform economies by offering valuable insights into the decision-making processes of manufacturers, third-party (3P) platforms, and retailers regarding channel structure choices in a 3P platform environment.