Russia in the politics of South Caucasus countries after 2022

<ns3:p>The research question is how national governments and civil societies reflect Russian involvement in the decision-making process of South Caucasus countries in 2022–2024? The structure of the research includes two sections: 1) Strategic interests of the countries of the South Caucasus and Russia in 2022–2024; 2) Changing the role of Russia in the South Caucasus in 2022–2024. In result of the research it was revealed that opting for a policy of normalization Georgia cannot renounce its territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Azerbaijan has been the most consistent among the Caucasian countries in challenging Russian hegemony in the region. This trend intensified after the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine: Azerbaijan increased humanitarian aid to Ukraine; pro-Ukrainian sympathies in Azerbaijani society were expressed through a number of leading media outlets that openly supported Kyiv. Baku unilaterally reviewed the ceasefire agreement - 2020, mediated by Russia. Amid the international isolation of the Kremlin, Azerbaijan began to play a much larger role for Russia. Baku is important link in the chain of diplomatic and economic ties of Putin's regime. Russia tries to maintain productive relations with Baku, even at the expense of its long-time ally Armenia. Yerevan revises its foreign policy, favouring a pro-Western vector. In Yerevan, the pro-Russian opposition organized rallies against the current government. Moscow and Baku both gained mutual benefits: Russia destabilized the situation in Armenia, and Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity. However, these actions of Moscow struck at its influence in the region, marginalizing Russia and its "guarantees." The Caucasus provides a clear example of Russia's inability to continue playing the role of a major power: it simply lacks the strength and means.</ns3:p>