Ascon-based Secure Physical Authentication with Relay-Attack Resistance
This study proposes a new side-channel authentication method utilizing the lightweight cipher, Ascon. Traditional side-channel authentication has relied on challenge-response mechanisms to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. However, by employing Ascon, an authenticated cipher, this research aims to achieve these security goals with a simple authentication algorithm without needing challenge-response communications. Furthermore, we effectively prevent the risk of recovering pre-shared keys by utilizing a side-channel attack countermeasure called leveled implementation. The system with the proposed method is particularly beneficial in environments requiring robust security measures, such as IoT applications dealing with sensitive data.
Authors
- Kazuo Sakiyama (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4414-815X)
- Daiki Miyahara (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5818-8937)
- Yang Li (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6836-0350)
- Runa Sako
Institutions
- University of Electro-Communications (JP)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2024-09-23
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/mass62177.2024.00073
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science