A Survey and Comparative Analysis of Security Properties of CAN Authentication Protocols

Modern cars’ complexity and increased reliance on electronic components have made them a prime target for attackers. In particular, the in-vehicle communication system is one of the major attack surfaces, with the Controller Area Network (CAN) being the most used protocol. CAN connects electronic components with each other, allowing them to communicate and carry out control functions, as well as managing the vehicle state. However, these components, called Electronic Control Units (ECUs), can also be exploited for malicious purposes. Indeed, since the CAN bus was not designed with security features, attackers can exploit its vulnerabilities to compromise ECUs and corrupt the communication, allowing for remote vehicle control, disabling breaks, and engine shutdowns, causing significant safety threats. In response to the absence of standardized authentication protocols within the automotive domain, researchers propose diverse solutions, each with unique strengths and vulnerabilities. However, the continuous influx of new protocols and potential oversights in meeting security requirements and essential operational features further complicate the implementability of these protocols. This paper comprehensively reviews and compares the 15 most prominent authentication protocols for the CAN bus. Our analysis emphasizes their strengths and weaknesses, evaluating their alignment with critical security requirements for automotive authentication. Additionally, we evaluate protocols based on essential operational criteria that contribute to ease of implementation in predefined infrastructures, enhancing overall reliability and reducing the probability of successful attacks. Our study reveals a prevalent focus on defending against external attackers in existing protocols, exposing vulnerabilities to internal threats. Notably, authentication protocols employing hash chains, Mixed Message Authentication Codes, and asymmetric encryption techniques emerge as the most effective approaches. Through our comparative study, we classify the considered protocols based on their security attributes and suitability for implementation, providing valuable insights for future developments in the field.

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Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Published
2024-10-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2024.3486367
Citations
13
Primary Topic
Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.54
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article

A Survey and Comparative Analysis of Security Properties of CAN Authentication Protocols

Alessandro Lotto, Mauro Conti, Alessandro Brighente, Francesco Marchiori
13 citations
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
4.54
article

A Survey and Comparative Analysis of Security Properties of CAN Authentication Protocols

Alessandro Lotto, Mauro Conti, Alessandro Brighente, Francesco Marchiori
article en
13 citations

Abstract

Modern cars’ complexity and increased reliance on electronic components have made them a prime target for attackers. In particular, the in-vehicle communication system is one of the major attack surfaces, with the Controller Area Network (CAN) being the most used protocol. CAN connects electronic components with each other, allowing them to communicate and carry out control functions, as well as managing the vehicle state. However, these components, called Electronic Control Units (ECUs), can also be exploited for malicious purposes. Indeed, since the CAN bus was not designed with security features, attackers can exploit its vulnerabilities to compromise ECUs and corrupt the communication, allowing for remote vehicle control, disabling breaks, and engine shutdowns, causing significant safety threats. In response to the absence of standardized authentication protocols within the automotive domain, researchers propose diverse solutions, each with unique strengths and vulnerabilities. However, the continuous influx of new protocols and potential oversights in meeting security requirements and essential operational features further complicate the implementability of these protocols. This paper comprehensively reviews and compares the 15 most prominent authentication protocols for the CAN bus. Our analysis emphasizes their strengths and weaknesses, evaluating their alignment with critical security requirements for automotive authentication. Additionally, we evaluate protocols based on essential operational criteria that contribute to ease of implementation in predefined infrastructures, enhancing overall reliability and reducing the probability of successful attacks. Our study reveals a prevalent focus on defending against external attackers in existing protocols, exposing vulnerabilities to internal threats. Notably, authentication protocols employing hash chains, Mixed Message Authentication Codes, and asymmetric encryption techniques emerge as the most effective approaches. Through our comparative study, we classify the considered protocols based on their security attributes and suitability for implementation, providing valuable insights for future developments in the field.

IEEE Communications Surveys & TutorialsVol. 27(4)
University of Padua (IT)
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
4.54
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