Application of the Hegemonic Party System in the Results of the Russian State Duma Elections: An Analysis of Effective Number of Parties, Electoral Volatility, and Proportional Index

The purpose of this study is to reinterpret Sartori&quots hegemonic party system model to empirically evaluate whether the Russian party system can be classified as a hegemonic party system. Voter stabilization was assessed by analyzing the effective number of parties and electoral volatility in State Duma election results. The potential for regime change was examined through the proportionality of the State Duma, the seat share of the ruling party, United Russia, and the duration of its dominance.<br/> During the 1990s, frequent establishment and dissolution of minor parties led to high effective numbers of parties and significant electoral volatility. However, following amendments to party laws and changes in the electoral system in the 2000s, the Russian party system is now considered relatively stable. Conversely, the tightening of party registration conditions and the restoration of the single-member district system significantly reduced the proportionality of the State Duma. Over five elections, United Russia secured an overwhelming majority of seats, transforming Russia into a hegemonic party system with limited political competition.<br/> However, Russia&quots hegemonic party system differs from the ideological hegemonic systems of socialist-era Poland or the pragmatic hegemonic systems of Mexico, which relied on hegemonic consensus to create regimes. United Russia&quots victories are based on support and loyalty to President Putin, resulting in a &quotone-person hegemonic party system&quot within Russia&quots political framework.