A Promising Piece of the Puzzle: Human Dignity and the Role of Section 1 of the Charter

In this brief piece, I want to take up Major’s invitation to think about the “puzzle” and the “promise” of human dignity, but from a different perspective. In particular, I want to consider whether any negative implications of adopting a conception of human dignity that encompasses the elderly offender who is sentenced to die in prison can be rationalized within the broader constitutional framework. My suggestion is that the tension relating to the “young” and “elderly” offenders may be better addressed by focusing on the role of section 1 of the Charter. While that provision received negligible mention in Bissonnette, it may be used to justify sentencing elderly offenders to effectively die in prison for heinous crimes like murder because any other approach would fail to adequately deter others, who are similarly situated, from committing such crimes. As I explain, this framework falls back on early recognition by the Supreme Court that utilitarian arguments for increasing punishment are properly considered as justifications, under section 1, for imposing what are otherwise “cruel and unusual treatments or punishments.”