SYSFID—System-Aware Fault-Injection Attack Detection for System-In-Package Architectures

Abstract A system-in-package (SiP) design takes advantage of cutting-edge packaging technology and heterogeneous integration (HI) in response to the growing need for aggressive time-to-market, high-performance, less expensive, and smaller systems. However, aggregating dies with different functionalities introduces new attack vectors with fault-injection attacks (FIA) that can effectively alter a circuit's data and control flow maliciously to cause disruptions of secure communication or sensitive information leakage. Additionally, traditional threat models associated with FIA on a 2D monolithic system-on-chip (SoC), and the corresponding mitigation techniques may not be compatible with modern 2.5D and 3D SiP architectures. To address these limitations, we propose system-aware fault injection attack detection for SiP architectures (SYSFID), a real-time and on-chip sensor-based fault monitoring approach integrated into a system-level design. SYSFID detects any fault-induced anomalous alterations in path delays of the components of inter-chiplet networks by strategically placing on-chip fault-to-time converter (FTC) sensors and controlling them efficiently to safeguard overall system security. To demonstrate the effectiveness of SYSFID, we detect several fault injection attempts on the FPGA implementation of a network-on-chip (NoC) based architecture during secure network packet transfers. Our experiments also illustrate that the SYSFID framework reliably senses both global and local FIAs with minimal overheads.