Does the Bike-Sharing Platform Share Its Own Private Information or Not in a Reverse Supply Chain?

Bike sharing facilitates the public’s daily lives and possesses substantial market demand, yet its overwhelming presence has triggered some environmental problems. To enhance resource utilization efficiency, we examine the decision-making strategies within a reverse supply chain considering the private information of the bike-sharing platform. Using Stackelberg games, two models are formulated in order to investigate whether the platform should share its own private information when the used shared bikes are recycled. A supply chain without private information is provided as a benchmark for comparison, and we obtain the optimal equilibrium strategies of the benchmark and the proposed model. Furthermore, how the optimal strategies change with the variation in parameters and the impacts of the private information on the optimal strategies are discussed. The results show that information asymmetry could lead to a reduction in supply chain efficiency. Thus, a two-part pricing contract is introduced to incentivize the platform to share information and coordinate the supply chain, which can effectively improve the performance of the integral supply chain and implement a “win-win” strategy for the third-party remanufacturer and the platform.