Life and repetition in Husserl's analyses from the first half of the 1920s

Abstract In his later writings, Husserl posits the original life of transcendental consciousness as the ultimate subject of phenomenological inquiry. Through self‐criticism in his work, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy , Husserl realises that the transcendence of representation remains unnoticed after the transcendental reduction. Consequently, he develops the method of apodictic reduction to reveal what is apodictic in consciousness. This method specifically reveals the living presence, as well as the constitution of immanent consciousness, to which the transcendence of representation belongs. Husserl refers to this transcendence as the first transcendence, in contrast to the second transcendence of the constitution of the world. The constitution of the first transcendence is not separate from the living streaming presence but rather belongs to the life of consciousness itself. And it is only through this transcendence of representation that the identifiable (and re‐identifiable) I with its life is constituted.