Australia’s bipolar approach to nuclear disarmament

Australia is a strong supporter of global nuclear (and conventional) arms control and non-proliferation measures and has contributed significantly to their development; but it sees the world, strategically, through the eyes of a nuclear weapon state which, it believes, applies its nuclear deterrence doctrine also to the defence of Australia. It is thus effectively locked into what is essentially a nuclear weapon state's view of the future that pays lip-service to nuclear disarmament as a distant ideal. Australian defence strategists routinely emphasise the importance of the US nuclear guarantee. Australia is though only likely to be attacked with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear war in which the United States is already engaged. The concept of extended nuclear deterrence thus assumes an essentially circular character by purporting to protect Australia from the nuclear threat that Australia's alliance with its provider invites. Meanwhile, Australia is one of the few countries in its own region that have yet to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This paper argues that - US hostility to the Treaty notwithstanding - Australian membership of the TPNW would be consistent with its generally positive disarmament record and compatible with its alliance commitments.