A Study of Pricing Strategies of Software Vendors Considering Strategic Consumer Waiting Time

The launch of a product by an advanced vendor attracts other vendors to join the product, and in the process leads to a direct delay effect due to the presence of strategic consumers. Considering the successive arrival of strategic consumers in the market, the optimal pricing strategy of the newcomer vendor in a duopoly environment as well as equilibrium pricing are investigated. Based on the utility function of consumers to determine the use interval of the product, construct a sequential game model with the rate of return function to determine the evolution path of equilibrium pricing of the vendor through simulation, and explore the timing of the entry of new vendors into the market. The results of the study show that newcomers have certain information advantages, and they can choose to improve the quality of their products while using lower prices to compete with the advanced manufacturers at the initial stage. Subsequently, when the rate of return of the advanced firms reaches a more stable state, the new entrants can also stabilize their rate of return after entering the market. The rate of return of newcomers throughout the period shows the characteristics of the stage, if the advanced manufacturers do not improve the quality of their products promptly, the newcomers enter the market for a certain period, to attract a large number of strategic consumers, stabilizing the rate of return.