The Interactive Effect of Extrinsic Controls and Public Service Motivation on Blame Avoidance

Extrinsic and intrinsic systems of control are two prominent determinants of bureaucratic behavior. An exploration of the respective effects of the two forms of control may overlook that they often interact to exert impacts on bureaucrats. Drawing on a dataset of 870 civil servants in China, this study examines the interactive effect of extrinsic controls and intrinsic public service motivation (PSM) on blame avoidance. Three extrinsic interventions are explored: contingent rewards, punishment, and peer influence. The results show that contingent rewards may inhibit blame avoidance, and civil servants with higher PSM are more likely to be incentivized by reward contingency to contain their blame-avoiding propensity. Furthermore, extrinsic punishment may provoke bureaucrats’ intention to avoid blame, but PSM can inhibit this propensity. Finally, bureaucrats with higher PSM are more inclined to be invigorated by their peers’ industriousness, whereas those low in PSM tend to shift responsibilities to their more hard-working associates.