Of Rivals and Enemies: Military–Police Relations in Internal Armed Conflict in Mexico and Colombia

While the dynamics of civil–military relations have traditionally been studied in a dyadic structure, internal deployment changes the relationship between armed agents and their civilian principals. While soldiers fight external wars alone, at home they fight alongside other centrally controlled armed agencies such as police and gendarmeries. This article studies the relationships between militaries, civilians, and centrally controlled police and gendarmeries, which I describe as “alternative security forces (ASFs)” in two democracies with high levels of internal armed conflict, Colombia and Mexico. Based on interview and archival data, I find that while militaries and ASFs will inevitably find themselves in rivalry, the “tone and tenor” of this rivalry matters for civilian governments. While an interservice rivalry allowed for ASF-military cooperation even in the face of competition in Colombia, a zero-sum rivalry in Mexico has hindered the development of law enforcement and perpetuated an unsuccessful over-reliance on the military.