Open grazing prohibition law, political economy of centralized law enforcement mechanism, and nomadic pastoralist-sedentary farmer relations in Nigeria

The anti-grazing law failed to curb the incessant pastoralist-farmer crises in postcolonial Nigeria. The leading explanation links failure to the non-enforceability of the law. This study reconsiders this lack of enforcement argument by focusing on the tripartite nexus between the law, class, and economic structure in the post-colonial state to explain the persistence of the herder-sedentary farmer conflict amidst the anti-open grazing regulation. Relying on Post-colonial state theory, this study argues that the Nigerian state and its political economy are skewed in favor of the ruling class. Consequently, the ruling class, which controls the state and its institutions, including law enforcement agencies, leverages this privilege to implement laws that advance its interests. In a situation where sub-national entities enact legislation that is deemed to undermine the interests of the ruling class, the latter relies on its control of the centralized state’s institutions to weaken its enforcement. Therefore, any attempt to redress the herder-sedentary farmer conflict through the instrument of law would likely continue to yield minimal outcomes. This study concludes with the need for comprehensive reform of the Nigerian state to dismantle the current system that perpetuates exclusivity, lawlessness, and inequality.