Necessitarianism in Leibniz with a view to contingency in natural science and theology

Abstract Leibniz distinguishes between contingent truths and necessary truths, but many commentators worry that Leibniz's contingent truths are not truly contingent. While scholars who consider Leibniz in the context of his work in the natural sciences often view Leibniz as a forerunner of the theory of contingent truths, scholars who consider his theological views tend to be considerably more concerned about the space for contingent truths in his system. This paper examines Leibniz's theory of contingent truths and shows that there are two distinct and initially unrelated dilemmas that forced the young Leibniz of the 1670s to recognize that not all things are necessary and prompted him to develop an idea of contingency: the first concerned natural laws in natural science and the other his idea of the theodicy. The present paper argues that Leibniz's theory of contingent truths based on the principle of sufficient reason is a solution to the question of the validity of natural laws and does not lead to necessitarianism. However, Leibniz maintains a series of commitments in theology, which push him towards necessitarianism throughout his lifetime.