Incentives of the digital platform of experimental resource-sharing for megaprojects

Purpose The suppliers of experimental resources required in megaprojects are driven by short-term interests, presuming that participation in the digital platform would only increase their inputs and fail to rapidly expand their revenue, resulting in their insufficient motivation to participate. This paper aims to design effective incentives for these suppliers exhibiting the aforementioned behaviour to drive them to participate and actively share their resources on the platform. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops incentives for applying the digital platform for experimental resource sharing by using a reverse induction approach to model and solve an incomplete information game. It compares the traditional experiment management mode and the new mode of applying the digital platform, taking the degree of sharing experimental resources on the platform as the variable and constructing three incentive models. By analysing these different degrees of sharing and the different experimental and informatisation capabilities of the suppliers, it could obtain the optimal incentive scheme for changes in sharing behaviour. Findings The results show that the designed incentives could increase the participation of suppliers in the platform and the number of their shared resources and make the benefits of both the supplier and the demand side reach the optimal state of a win-win situation. However, a higher degree of sharing by suppliers does not yield better results. In addition, the incentive coefficients for this degree should be set based on the suppliers’ different experimental and informatisation capabilities and the ratio of input cost-sharing, so as to avoid blind inputs from both supply and demand. Originality/value This study fills the research gap regarding incentives of the digital platform of experimental resource-sharing for megaprojects; it contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a quantitative perspective of understanding the experimental resource-sharing behaviour that motivates the usage of the digital platform. Furthermore, it reveals the incentive mechanism for application in different scenarios, and quantitative analysis is conducted to provide practical insights into promoting the new experiment management mode in megaprojects for more effective incentivisation.

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Publication Details

Journal
Engineering Construction & Architectural Management
Published
2024-10-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1108/ecam-11-2023-1101
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.55
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article

Incentives of the digital platform of experimental resource-sharing for megaprojects

Guohua Zhou, Wang Yu-ying
1 citations
Engineering Construction & Architectural Management
Digital Platforms and Economics
0.55
article

Incentives of the digital platform of experimental resource-sharing for megaprojects

Guohua Zhou, Wang Yu-ying
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Purpose The suppliers of experimental resources required in megaprojects are driven by short-term interests, presuming that participation in the digital platform would only increase their inputs and fail to rapidly expand their revenue, resulting in their insufficient motivation to participate. This paper aims to design effective incentives for these suppliers exhibiting the aforementioned behaviour to drive them to participate and actively share their resources on the platform. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops incentives for applying the digital platform for experimental resource sharing by using a reverse induction approach to model and solve an incomplete information game. It compares the traditional experiment management mode and the new mode of applying the digital platform, taking the degree of sharing experimental resources on the platform as the variable and constructing three incentive models. By analysing these different degrees of sharing and the different experimental and informatisation capabilities of the suppliers, it could obtain the optimal incentive scheme for changes in sharing behaviour. Findings The results show that the designed incentives could increase the participation of suppliers in the platform and the number of their shared resources and make the benefits of both the supplier and the demand side reach the optimal state of a win-win situation. However, a higher degree of sharing by suppliers does not yield better results. In addition, the incentive coefficients for this degree should be set based on the suppliers’ different experimental and informatisation capabilities and the ratio of input cost-sharing, so as to avoid blind inputs from both supply and demand. Originality/value This study fills the research gap regarding incentives of the digital platform of experimental resource-sharing for megaprojects; it contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a quantitative perspective of understanding the experimental resource-sharing behaviour that motivates the usage of the digital platform. Furthermore, it reveals the incentive mechanism for application in different scenarios, and quantitative analysis is conducted to provide practical insights into promoting the new experiment management mode in megaprojects for more effective incentivisation.

Engineering Construction & Architectural ManagementVol. 32(12)
Southwest Jiaotong University (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 21%
Digital Platforms and Economics
0.55
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