Revised Normative Behaviourism: An Experimental Proposal

Abstract The debate on bottom-up approaches in political theory has been recently enriched by Jonathan Floyd’s “normative behaviourism”, an approach that starts from and refers to actual behaviours so as to let normative concerns emerge and political responses be found. Despite its merits, I argue that normative behaviourism suffers from three weaknesses: the tip of the iceberg , the invisibility , and the over-inclusive justification problems. These problems emerge because behaviours can be normatively significant only when the beliefs behind those behaviours are known. To overcome these problems, I suggest a “revised” version of normative behaviourism, which makes use of focus groups to reach two objectives: first, to understand the beliefs driving behaviours; and, second, to filter out unacceptable beliefs that might lead to inappropriate political solutions when their corresponding behaviour is considered normatively relevant for institutional reform. While revised normative behaviourism is still at the stage of a drafted proposal, it has the potential to pave a way for data collection to contribute to the very formulation of normative standards rather than just to the identification of practical constraints to the application of normative standards.