Robustness analysis of power cyber-physical system considering mixed information attack risk

With the integration of information networks and traditional power grids, the power information physical integration system (CPPS) has become the foundation of modern smart grids. However, the establishment of information networks has also brought new challenges to the safe and stable operation of smart grids. In CPPS, false data injection attacks (FDIA) and denial of service (DoS) attacks are two common attack methods. FDIA attacks may interfere with the evaluation of power grid status, mislead the control center to issue unnecessary or erroneous instructions; while DoS attacks occupy communication resources by sending a large number of fake data packets to the communication network channel, thereby affecting the control center’s judgment and control of the power grid operation status. Both types of attacks pose a threat to the safe and stable operation of CPPS. Given that a singular attack may not effectively accomplish the desired outcome of the attacker and that mixed attacks are increasingly preferred, this study examines the impact of a mixed attack model on the resilience of CPPS systems, specifically from the perspective of the attacker. By incorporating the attributes of DoS attacks into the FDIA model, simulation experiments are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the mixed attack model. Based on the simulation results of IEEE standard data sets, compared with FDIA, the hybrid attack model can achieve similar attack objectives with less attack cost. On the one hand, the hybrid attack model expands the application scope of information attack and unifies FDIA and DOS models. On the other hand, The findings of this study will help CPPS system operators better understand the security risks of CPPS systems and provide new research ideas for improving CPPS system detection algorithms and mechanisms.