Sartre's Exclusion Claim: Perception and Imagination as Radically Distinct Consciousnesses

Abstract In The Imaginary Jean‐Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience ‐ I call this the exclusion claim . This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre's exclusion claim. First, it frames the claim in terms of cross‐modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to simultaneously attend to what one is imagining and what one is perceiving. However, this leaves it open that a subject can simultaneously imagine and perceive on the condition that either the perceived or imagined objects are not attended to . While this is a philosophically plausible position it fails to do justice to Sartre's intended position, which suggests a more radical exclusion between perception and imagination. In light of this section 3 develops a supplementary argument to remove one of the possible configurations of attention that the ban on divided attention leaves in place by arguing that the objects of imagining must be attended to, which follows from Sartre's characterisation of imagination as spontaneous. The resulting exclusion is as follows: attentive perception excludes imagination (and vice versa), given that the latter is necessarily attentive, but attentive imagination can co‐occur with non‐attentive or background perception (in this sense the exclusion is asymmetric in a way that Sartre fails to recognise). In concluding I detail how from this exclusion we get an important consequence – which Sartre wants the exclusion claim to have – namely that it rules out an imagination‐based solution to the problem of perceptual presence.