Empirical Assessment of Benefits of Acquisition of L5 First in a Range of Jamming Cases

The frequency of occurrence of GNSS jamming and spoofing is increasing on multiple fronts. Areas of Eastern Europe are experiencing frequent jamming and spoofing in a wartime environment. This paper first presents evidence of Electronic Warefar (EW) jamming as measured from the southern coast of Finland. Secondly, the paper presents a study of how mass market receivers respond to a coordinated spoofing and RFI attack near Haifa Israel. All mass market GNSS devices with L1 and L5 are captured report their location in Beirut Lebanon. However, a oneNav L5 Direct ™ receiver operates normally. The paper suggests that mass market receivers must fundamentally change the way they acquire signals in case spoofing is suspected: that is, receivers must acquire signals independently so that they cannot be captured by a single point of failure. L1 C/A is such a single point of failure in the L1 band. The paper suggests that the Galileo E5a Quasi pilot is also a single point of failure. To avoid these weaknesses and survive spoofing, receivers should adopt the independent signal acquisition approach implemented in the oneNav L5-Direct ™ receiver.