Akrasia and the Virtuous Exemplar in Rumi’s <i>Masnavi</i> and Aristotle’s <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>

Abstract This article examines the transmission of virtue in Maulānā Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Balkhī’s (heretoforth Rumi) Masnavi and compares this with similar concerns in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. This article argues that both philosophers have analogous concepts of the virtuous exemplar and akrasia, or “weakness of will,” two central problems in the transmission of virtue. With this similarity in mind, this article analyzes the unique way in which each philosopher discusses the nuances of virtue ethics, as Rumi deliberately communicates his insights in poem and anecdote, whereas Aristotle conveys his philosophy via intellectual discourse. Lastly, this article argues that Rumi’s form of storytelling is a crucial component in the transmission of virtue.