The role of military directors in holding the CEO accountable for poor firm performance

Abstract Research Summary Why do some boards of directors dismiss the CEO when a firm performs poorly, while others do not? We argue that military directors—outside directors with military backgrounds—on the board increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal under low‐performance conditions. Military service instills a lifelong system of values and beliefs related to accountability—the obligation to accept responsibility for one's own actions and outcomes—which leads military directors to attribute low performance to the CEO and hold the CEO strictly accountable for such performance. This argument is supported by extensive quantitative data on CEO dismissal in publicly listed firms and qualitative data obtained from interviews with military directors who have served on boards of those firms. Managerial Summary Military directors—outside directors with military backgrounds—frequently occupy seats on the boards of publicly listed firms in the United States. Military service instills an enduring system of values and beliefs rooted in accountability, which, we argue, makes military directors more inclined to attribute performance shortfalls to the CEO and advocate for more rigorous CEO accountability, resulting in CEO dismissal. Our argument is supported by quantitative data on CEO dismissals within publicly listed firms and qualitative data derived from interviews with military directors who have served on boards of those firms. Our findings underscore that principles ingrained via military service may influence corporate governance, particularly one of its core components: executive accountability.

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Publication Details

Journal
Strategic Management Journal
Published
2024-10-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3675
Citations
10
Primary Topic
Human Resource and Talent Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
6.75

Funders

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article

The role of military directors in holding the CEO accountable for poor firm performance

Thomas Keil, Stevo Pavićević
10 citations
Strategic Management Journal
Human Resource and Talent Management
6.75
article

The role of military directors in holding the CEO accountable for poor firm performance

Thomas Keil, Stevo Pavićević
article en
10 citations

Abstract

Abstract Research Summary Why do some boards of directors dismiss the CEO when a firm performs poorly, while others do not? We argue that military directors—outside directors with military backgrounds—on the board increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal under low‐performance conditions. Military service instills a lifelong system of values and beliefs related to accountability—the obligation to accept responsibility for one's own actions and outcomes—which leads military directors to attribute low performance to the CEO and hold the CEO strictly accountable for such performance. This argument is supported by extensive quantitative data on CEO dismissal in publicly listed firms and qualitative data obtained from interviews with military directors who have served on boards of those firms. Managerial Summary Military directors—outside directors with military backgrounds—frequently occupy seats on the boards of publicly listed firms in the United States. Military service instills an enduring system of values and beliefs rooted in accountability, which, we argue, makes military directors more inclined to attribute performance shortfalls to the CEO and advocate for more rigorous CEO accountability, resulting in CEO dismissal. Our argument is supported by quantitative data on CEO dismissals within publicly listed firms and qualitative data derived from interviews with military directors who have served on boards of those firms. Our findings underscore that principles ingrained via military service may influence corporate governance, particularly one of its core components: executive accountability.

Strategic Management JournalVol. 46(3)
Zurich University of Applied Sciences in Business Administration (CH), University of Zurich (CH), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management (DE)
Nanyang Technological University
No poverty
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Human Resource and Talent Management
6.75
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The role of military directors in holding the CEO accountable for poor firm performance — Thomas Keil, Stevo Pavićević · Strategic Management Journal (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS