q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules
This paper introduces the q -fixed majority property for committee selection rules, which extends the traditional fixed majority principle to a flexible framework. We examine conditions under which the committee scoring rules satisfy the q -fixed majority property. Focusing on (weakly) separable rules, we find that the Bloc rule is the only which satisfies it for all q > 1 / 2 . In addition, the q -bottom majority property is introduced, highlighting conditions under which committees can be excluded based on voter consensus.
Authors
- Éric Kamwa (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6441-2766)
- Clinton Gubong Gassi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-2984-4484)
Institutions
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Université de Yaoundé I (CM)
- Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (FR)
- Université Marie et Louis Pasteur (FR)
- Université de Strasbourg (FR)
- Université de Lorraine (FR)
- Université de Franche-Comté (FR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Operations Research Letters
- Published
- 2025-03-29
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2025.107282
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Université de Franche-Comté