Electoral Systems and the Autocrat’s Trade-Off: Evidence from the Russian Duma

abstract: Legislative elections sustain authoritarian regimes, but distinct electoral systems simultaneously benefit and hurt the political prospects of those regimes. The author theorizes about a trade-off between electoral systems that facilitate information on local elite preferences, and systems that maintain legislative control. An electoral system can achieve either, but not at the same time. The author undertakes an empirical study of Russian federal deputies, half of whom are elected in single-member districts, the other half on a nationwide closed-party list. Candidates can register on both lists (N = 515), and district results determine final list affiliation. Electoral incentives change abruptly for deputies who are barely winning or losing their district, a fact that the author exploits to identify the effects of local representation on pro- and antiregime parliamentary behavior. The results support a trade-off: district-list deputies convey more information on local preferences in their speeches than party-list deputies do, but they oppose law proposals more frequently. How autocrats weigh this trade-off determines the electoral system and illuminates electoral reform in autocracies.