Avicenna on the Faculties of the Soul: A Critical Analysis with an Examination of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Criticisms

Abstract This article examines Avicenna’s responses to three questions regarding the soul: (1) Why does the soul require faculties? (2) Why are the soul’s faculties multiple? (3) What is the criterion for their multiplicity? Avicenna uses the rule of one and the soul’s simplicity to explain these questions, introducing multiple faculties to resolve the paradox of the soul performing various actions. He argues that the diversity of faculties is due to the generic difference between actions. Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī raises four objections to Avicenna’s explanation. This paper also scrutinizes al-Rāzī’s objections to understand Avicenna’s theory better.