Undesirably risky affairs: resuscitating the desire-based approach to risk as harm

This paper engages with the longstanding debate over whether being exposed to a risk of harm amounts to harm itself (what I call ‘risk-harm’). The dominant view has been that those exposed to risks of harm do not suffer harm. In this paper, I defend the widely unpopular subjectivist account of risk-harm – according to which those exposed to unwanted risks of harm can suffer harm – against prominent objections that have been levied against it. The first section sets out to renew and strengthen the appeal of the account in light of recent developments in the surrounding literature. The second section defends the account against arguably its most formidable objection, namely the claim that there is no such thing as risk-harm. The third section wraps up by parrying some prominent general objections, which highlight potentially undesirable upshots to accepting the existence of risk-harm.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Legal Philosophy
Published
2024-10-09
DOI
https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2024.02.02
Primary Topic
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Undesirably risky affairs: resuscitating the desire-based approach to risk as harm

Yan Kai Zhou
Journal of Legal Philosophy
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
article

Undesirably risky affairs: resuscitating the desire-based approach to risk as harm

Yan Kai Zhou
article en

Abstract

This paper engages with the longstanding debate over whether being exposed to a risk of harm amounts to harm itself (what I call ‘risk-harm’). The dominant view has been that those exposed to risks of harm do not suffer harm. In this paper, I defend the widely unpopular subjectivist account of risk-harm – according to which those exposed to unwanted risks of harm can suffer harm – against prominent objections that have been levied against it. The first section sets out to renew and strengthen the appeal of the account in light of recent developments in the surrounding literature. The second section defends the account against arguably its most formidable objection, namely the claim that there is no such thing as risk-harm. The third section wraps up by parrying some prominent general objections, which highlight potentially undesirable upshots to accepting the existence of risk-harm.

Journal of Legal PhilosophyVol. 49(2)
Queen Mary University of London (GB)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 82%
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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