On Scheduling Mechanisms Beyond the Worst Case

Abstract The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design (Nisan and Ronen, Algorithmic mechanism design(extended abstract). In: Proceedings of the Thirty First Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 129–140, 1999. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning m tasks to n machines for execution. Machines are regarded as strategic agents who may lie about their execution costs so as to minimize their time cost. To address the situation when monetary payment is not an option to compensate the machines’ costs, Koutsoupias (Theory Comput Syst 54:375–387, 2014) devised two truthful mechanisms, K and P respectively, that achieves an approximation ratio of $$\frac{n+1}{2}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mfrac> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>n</mml:mi> <mml:mo>+</mml:mo> <mml:mn>1</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> <mml:mn>2</mml:mn> </mml:mfrac> </mml:math> and n , for social cost minimization. In addition, no truthful mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than $$\frac{n+1}{2}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mfrac> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>n</mml:mi> <mml:mo>+</mml:mo> <mml:mn>1</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> <mml:mn>2</mml:mn> </mml:mfrac> </mml:math> . Hence, mechanism K is optimal. While the approximation ratio provides a strong worst-case guarantee, it also limits us to a comprehensive understanding of mechanism performance on various inputs. This paper investigates these two scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case. We first show that mechanism K achieves a smaller social cost than mechanism P on every input. That is, mechanism K is pointwise better than mechanism P. Next, for each task, when machines’ execution costs are independent and identically drawn from a task-specific distribution, we show that the average-case approximation ratio of mechanism K converges to a constant determined by the task-specific distribution. This bound is tight for mechanism K. For a better understanding of this distribution-dependent constant, on the one hand, we estimate its value by plugging in a few common distributions; on the other, we show that this converging bound improves a known bound (Zhang in Algorithmica 83(6):1638–1652, 2021)) which only captures the single-task setting. Last, we find that the average-case approximation ratio of mechanism P converges to the same constant.

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Publication Details

Journal
Algorithmica
Published
2024-10-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-024-01277-6
Primary Topic
Scheduling and Optimization Algorithms
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

On Scheduling Mechanisms Beyond the Worst Case

Jie Zhang, Yansong Gao
Algorithmica
Scheduling and Optimization Algorithms
article

On Scheduling Mechanisms Beyond the Worst Case

Jie Zhang, Yansong Gao
article en

Abstract

Abstract The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design (Nisan and Ronen, Algorithmic mechanism design(extended abstract). In: Proceedings of the Thirty First Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 129–140, 1999. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning m tasks to n machines for execution. Machines are regarded as strategic agents who may lie about their execution costs so as to minimize their time cost. To address the situation when monetary payment is not an option to compensate the machines’ costs, Koutsoupias (Theory Comput Syst 54:375–387, 2014) devised two truthful mechanisms, K and P respectively, that achieves an approximation ratio of $$\frac{n+1}{2}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mfrac> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>n</mml:mi> <mml:mo>+</mml:mo> <mml:mn>1</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> <mml:mn>2</mml:mn> </mml:mfrac> </mml:math> and n , for social cost minimization. In addition, no truthful mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than $$\frac{n+1}{2}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mfrac> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>n</mml:mi> <mml:mo>+</mml:mo> <mml:mn>1</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> <mml:mn>2</mml:mn> </mml:mfrac> </mml:math> . Hence, mechanism K is optimal. While the approximation ratio provides a strong worst-case guarantee, it also limits us to a comprehensive understanding of mechanism performance on various inputs. This paper investigates these two scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case. We first show that mechanism K achieves a smaller social cost than mechanism P on every input. That is, mechanism K is pointwise better than mechanism P. Next, for each task, when machines’ execution costs are independent and identically drawn from a task-specific distribution, we show that the average-case approximation ratio of mechanism K converges to a constant determined by the task-specific distribution. This bound is tight for mechanism K. For a better understanding of this distribution-dependent constant, on the one hand, we estimate its value by plugging in a few common distributions; on the other, we show that this converging bound improves a known bound (Zhang in Algorithmica 83(6):1638–1652, 2021)) which only captures the single-task setting. Last, we find that the average-case approximation ratio of mechanism P converges to the same constant.

AlgorithmicaVol. 87(1)
Applied Mathematics (United States) (US), University of Bath (GB), University of Pennsylvania (US)
Leverhulme Trust, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
Decent work and economic growth
Openalex Percentile: Top 75%
Scheduling and Optimization Algorithms
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