Universal Composability Is Robust Compilation
This article discusses the relationship between two frameworks: universal composability ( \(\mathsf{UC}\) ) and robust compilation ( RC ). In cryptography, \(\mathsf{UC}\) is a framework for the specification and analysis of cryptographic protocols with a strong compositionality guarantee: \(\mathsf{UC}\) protocols remain secure even when composed with other protocols. In programming language security, RC is a novel framework for determining secure compilation by proving whether compiled programs are as secure as their source-level counterparts no matter what target-level code they interact with. Presently, these disciplines are studied in isolation, though we argue that there is a deep connection between them and exploring this connection will benefit both research fields. This article formally proves the connection between \(\mathsf{UC}\) and RC and then it explores the benefits of this connection (focussing on perfect, rather than computational \(\mathsf{UC}\) ). For this, this article first identifies which conditions must programming languages fulfil in order to possibly attain \(\mathsf{UC}\) -like composition. Then, it proves \(\mathsf{UC}\) of both an existing and a new commitment protocol as a corollary of the related compilers attaining RC . Finally, it mechanises these proofs in DEEPSEC, obtaining symbolic guarantees that the protocol is indeed \(\mathsf{UC}\) . Our connection lays the groundwork towards a better and deeper understanding of both \(\mathsf{UC}\) and RC , and the benefits we showcase from this connection provide evidence of scalable mechanised proofs for \(\mathsf{UC}\) .
Authors
- Marco Patrignani (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3411-9678)
- Riad S. Wahby (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0224-1989)
- Ethan Cecchetti (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7900-8328)
- Robert Künnemann (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0822-9283)
Institutions
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- University of Trento (IT)
- Helmholtz Center for Information Security (DE)
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems
- Published
- 2024-10-10
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3698234
- Primary Topic
- Security and Verification in Computing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Max Planck Institute for Software Systems
- Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung
- Office of Naval Research