No evidence for a difference in Bayesian reasoning for egocentric versus allocentric spatial cognition

Bayesian reasoning (i.e. prior integration, cue combination, and loss minimization) has emerged as a prominent model for some kinds of human perception and cognition. The major theoretical issue is that we do not yet have a robust way to predict when we will or will not observe Bayesian effects in human performance. Here we tested a proposed divide in terms of Bayesian reasoning for egocentric spatial cognition versus allocentric spatial cognition (self-centered versus world-centred). The proposal states that people will show stronger Bayesian reasoning effects when it is possible to perform the Bayesian calculations within the egocentric frame, as opposed to requiring an allocentric frame. Three experiments were conducted with one egocentric-allowing condition and one allocentric-requiring condition but otherwise matched as closely as possible. No difference was found in terms of prior integration (Experiment 1), cue combination (Experiment 2), or loss minimization (Experiment 3). The contrast in previous reports, where Bayesian effects are present in many egocentric-allowing tasks while they are absent in many allocentric-requiring tasks, is likely due to other differences between the tasks-for example, the way allocentric-requiring tasks are often more complex and memory intensive.