Defining and Operationalising Defiant Non‐Compliance in the EU: The Rule of Law Case

Abstract Existing literature often attributes non‐compliance to either a lack of resources or implementation costs. However, the rule of law crises in Hungary and Poland present a different picture: a deliberate strategy aimed at not complying with EU enforcement actions. This article differentiates this model from previous ones and terms it ‘defiant non‐compliance’, which is characterised by four types of domestic actions (ignoring the Commission's recommendations and warnings; not complying with Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) rulings; questioning the role of the CJEU as the sole final interpreter of EU law; and impeding national courts' right to raise preliminary questions). A defiant rhetoric questioning the authority and legitimacy of the enforcing authorities accompanies these actions. The article distils defiant non‐compliance by systematising empirical evidence on these governments' reactions to EU enforcement. This model of non‐compliance severely threatens the foundations of the EU, as it erodes the notion of a community of law‐abiding member states' governments.