TRIMP: Three-Sided Stable Matching for Distributed Vehicle Sharing System Using Stackelberg Game

Distributed Vehicle Sharing System (DVSS) leverages emerging technologies such as blockchain to create a secure, transparent, and efficient platform for sharing vehicles. In such a system, both efficient matching of users with available vehicles and optimal pricing mechanisms play crucial roles in maximizing system revenue. However, most existing schemes utilize user-to-vehicle (two-sided) matching and pricing, which are unrealistic for DVSS due to the lack of participation of service providers. To address this issue, we propose in this paper a novel Three-sided stable Matching with an optimal Pricing (TRIMP) scheme. First, to achieve maximum utilities for all three parties simultaneously, we formulate the optimal policy and pricing problem as a three-stage Stackelberg game and derive its equilibrium points accordingly. Second, relying on these solutions from the Stackelberg game, we construct a three-sided cyclic matching for DVSS. Third, as the existence of such a matching is NP-complete, we design a specific vehicle sharing algorithm to realize stable matching. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our TRIMP scheme, which optimizes the matching process and ensures efficient resource allocation, leading to a more stable and well-functioning decentralized vehicle sharing ecosystem.

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Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Published
2024-10-07
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2024.3475481
Citations
6
Primary Topic
Transportation and Mobility Innovations
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.22

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article

TRIMP: Three-Sided Stable Matching for Distributed Vehicle Sharing System Using Stackelberg Game

Norio Shiratori, Tarik Taleb, Jia Liu, Chen Lyu et al.
6 citations
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Transportation and Mobility Innovations
1.22
article

TRIMP: Three-Sided Stable Matching for Distributed Vehicle Sharing System Using Stackelberg Game

Norio Shiratori, Tarik Taleb, Jia Liu, Chen Lyu, Shanshan Zhang, Xu Yang
article en
6 citations

Abstract

Distributed Vehicle Sharing System (DVSS) leverages emerging technologies such as blockchain to create a secure, transparent, and efficient platform for sharing vehicles. In such a system, both efficient matching of users with available vehicles and optimal pricing mechanisms play crucial roles in maximizing system revenue. However, most existing schemes utilize user-to-vehicle (two-sided) matching and pricing, which are unrealistic for DVSS due to the lack of participation of service providers. To address this issue, we propose in this paper a novel Three-sided stable Matching with an optimal Pricing (TRIMP) scheme. First, to achieve maximum utilities for all three parties simultaneously, we formulate the optimal policy and pricing problem as a three-stage Stackelberg game and derive its equilibrium points accordingly. Second, relying on these solutions from the Stackelberg game, we construct a three-sided cyclic matching for DVSS. Third, as the existence of such a matching is NP-complete, we design a specific vehicle sharing algorithm to realize stable matching. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our TRIMP scheme, which optimizes the matching process and ensures efficient resource allocation, leading to a more stable and well-functioning decentralized vehicle sharing ecosystem.

IEEE Transactions on Mobile ComputingVol. 24(2)
Xidian University (CN), Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (CN), National Institute of Informatics (JP), Ruhr University Bochum (DE), Chuo University (JP)
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Openalex Percentile: Top 22%
Transportation and Mobility Innovations
1.22
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