Attacking trapdoors from matrix products
Recently, Geraud-Stewart and Naccache proposed two trapdoors based on matrix products. In this paper, we answer the call for cryptanalysis. We explore how using the trace and determinant of a matrix can be used to attack their constructions. We fully break their first construction in a polynomial-time attack. We show an information leak in the second construction using characteristic polynomials, and provide two attacks that decrease the bit security by about half.
Authors
- Thomas Decru (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0253-4180)
- Christophe Petit (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3482-6743)
- Tako Boris Fouotsa (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1821-8406)
- Paul Frixons
- Valerie Gilchrist
Institutions
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- University of Birmingham (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Published
- 2024-10-07
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.62056/avrxrudhdj
- Primary Topic
- Coding theory and cryptography
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Fonds De La Recherche Scientifique - FNRS
- Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council