An Argument for a Strong Force Semantics of <i>Believe</i>

Abstract The English verb believe is usually taken to encode universal quantification over possibilities (Hintikka 1969) and thus it is predicted to carry a strong modal force. Faced with the intuition that believe feels weaker than uncontroversially strong modals like sure, Hawthorne et al. (2016) instead propose that believe carries a weak modal force, requiring that the agent’s degree of certainty exceed some vague standard and drawing a parallel to relative gradable adjectives like tall. The current contribution takes to heart the idea that believe is gradable but shows that its scale properties in fact argue against a weak force semantics: the scale of believe is upper-closed and so its default standard must be the scale maximum (Kennedy and McNally 2005; Kennedy 2007). This results in a strong modal force, suggesting that the felt weakness of believe is rooted in its ‘subjective’ modal flavor (cf. Lyons 1977; Kratzer 1981) arising from the fact that believe maps propositions to degrees of credence.