On the nature of a legally significant compromise

In the first decades of the 21st century, legal scholars paid attention to the phenomenon of compromise in law. Some of its aspects were covered in both general theoretical and industry-specific legal studies. In this article, the author draws attention to a range of problems in the field of compromise in law that, for some reason, remained outside the field of view of researchers. In particular, he states the presence of a tendency to idealize the phenomenon under consideration. The absence of a single generally accepted approach to its definition is noted. The author also draws attention to the fact that in modern domestic legal science an unjustifiably narrow understanding of compromise in law has developed. He provides a system of arguments in favor of the fact that the number of legally significant compromises should not be limited exclusively to socially useful compromises. Along with them, some socially harmful compromises should also have a legal coloring. The author has formulated proposals aimed at improving the conceptual and categorical apparatus of legal science. In particular, he proposes to operate with such concepts as “legally significant compromise”, “egal compromise”, “illegal (unlawful) compromise”.